The Leveson Inquiry, which reported in 2012 after examining phone hacking and other press abuses, recommended the creation of an independent press regulator with specific structural features: independence from both the press industry and the government, a low-cost arbitration service for complainants, the power to investigate systemic issues proactively, and recognition through a Royal Charter that would verify the regulator met certain minimum standards.
IPSO — the Independent Press Standards Organisation — was created by the newspaper industry in 2014. It covers approximately 1,500 titles and has a board with an independent chair and a majority of independent members. But its structure differs from Leveson’s recommendations in ways that are not incidental.
The Leveson Model and the IPSO Reality
Leveson recommended a regulator with the power to initiate investigations into serious or systemic wrongdoing without waiting for a complaint. IPSO can initiate “standards investigations” without a complaint, but has rarely used this power: in its eleven-year history, it has initiated fewer than ten such investigations. The Leveson model anticipated a regulator that would actively scrutinise press conduct; IPSO operates primarily as a complaint-handling body.
Leveson recommended a low-cost arbitration service, available to complainants as an alternative to expensive litigation. Such a service would allow ordinary individuals — not just those who can afford defamation lawyers — to seek remedies for press abuses. IPSO does not offer arbitration. The absence of this service means that access to substantive press accountability remains largely dependent on financial resources.
Leveson recommended recognition through a Royal Charter, with an independent recognition body verifying that the regulator met minimum standards. The recognition body — the Press Recognition Panel (PRP) — was established. IPSO has not applied for recognition. IMPRESS, a smaller regulator covering a minority of news publishers, is the only currently recognised regulator. IPSO’s 2024 annual report did not reference recognition or the PRP.
The Funding Structure
IPSO is funded by a levy on its member publishers, calculated by reference to circulation and reach. This means the largest publishers — those whose conduct is most likely to be complained about, and whose interests are most directly affected by regulatory stringency — contribute the most to IPSO’s funding. Critics argue this creates a structural dependency that limits regulatory assertiveness.
IPSO’s chair and board are appointed through a process overseen by an appointments panel with independent members. But the Regulatory Funding Company — the body through which member publishers fund IPSO — has powers that the Leveson model did not envisage for any industry body: it can propose changes to IPSO’s governance, and major structural changes to IPSO require publisher agreement.
Complaint Outcomes
IPSO publishes data on complaint outcomes annually. In 2024/25, it received 14,382 complaints. Of these, 14,009 did not proceed to formal investigation — either because they were out of scope, were resolved directly between the complainant and publisher, or did not disclose a potential breach on assessment. Formal investigations were concluded in 373 cases; breaches were found in 147 cases.
When a breach is found, the available sanction is publication of an adjudication by the offending title. There is no fine available to IPSO for individual editorial breaches — fines of up to £1 million are theoretically available for “serious and systemic” failure, but none has been imposed. The contrast with OFCOM’s regulatory powers, which include substantial financial penalties, is stark.
Hacked Off, the campaign group representing phone hacking victims, described IPSO in its 2025 assessment as “a pale shadow of what Leveson recommended — a complaints handler with limited powers and a structural relationship with its regulated industry that prevents genuinely independent regulation.” IPSO rejected this characterisation, saying it was “an independent, effective regulator operating in line with its remit.”